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Abstract
We contrast two potential explanations of the substantial differences in entrepre-
neurial activity observed across geographical areas: entry costs and external effects.
We extend the Lucas model of entrepreneurship to allow for heterogeneous entry costs
and for externalities that shift the distribution of entrepreneurial talents. We show that
these assumptions have opposite predictions on the relation between entrepreneurial ac-
tivity and firm level TFP: with different entry costs, in areas with more entrepreneurs
firms’ average productivity should be lower and vice versa. We test these implications on
a sample of Italian firms and unambiguously reject the entry costs explanation in favor
of the externalities one. We also investigate the sources of external effects, finding ro-
bust evidence that learning externalities are an important determinant of cross-sectional
differences in entrepreneurial activity.
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1 Introduction
There is a vast literature linking a country’s endowment of “entrepreneurship” with eco-
nomic prosperity. Environments where entrepreneurs can emerge easily are propitious to
the creation of firms, their growth and their success. These ideas date back to Marshall
(1890) and Schumpeter (1911): for example, the latter sees the entrepreneur as the carrier
of innovation and hence the true engine of growth. But if entrepreneurship is so central to
economic development, what drives it? Why are there so many entrepreneurs in some areas,
such as Silicon Valley, and so few in others? Do these differences just reflect differences in
opportunities driven by - say - the presence of Stanford University? Why do we find these
clusters in some countries rather than others, and in particular areas within countries, such
as in the Italian industrial districts or the Ruhr? These important questions have often
been in the forefront of policy debate and government intervention.
To answer these questions, one must address the choice to become an entrepreneur.
Perhaps the best known model of entrepreneurship is that of Lucas (1978), explaining who
in a given population will become an entrepreneur using differences in exogenously given
individual talents. In Lucas, “talent” is identified with the ability to extract output from
a given combination of inputs. Thus, more talented individuals are those who can obtain
a higher total factor productivity (TFP) if they start a business. Since individuals with
more talent make more profits, they will choose to be entrepreneurs. But what can explain
clusters if we do not believe in genetic differences, i.e. if the distribution at birth of individual
ability is the same across populations?
In this paper we extend the Lucas model to investigate two potential explanations of
differences in entrepreneurial density across locations: entry costs and external effects.
One possibility is that there are heterogeneous costs of entry, and the locations with lower
costs of setting up a firm end up with more entrepreneurs and more firms because even
relatively less talented individuals will find it profitable to start a business. This is the
approach implicitly followed by the large literature that focusses on factors - particularly
financial - that keep the would-be entrepreneur from actually creating a new firm. Banerjee
and Newman (1994), for instance, show that credit constraints can lead to poverty traps,
since potential entrepreneurs cannot invest in profitable occupations involving set-up costs.
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It is well documented empirically that limited access to financial markets can hinder the
emergence of entrepreneurs.1 More recently it has also been shown that regulation-induced
high costs of entry hamper firm and employment creation (Klapper, Laeven and Rajan
2004, Bertrand and Kramarz 2002, Fonseca, Lopez-Garcia and Pissarides 2001).
The second possibility is that the distribution of individual productivity is shifted by
local externalities, for instance because of learning opportunities, knowledge spillovers or
intermediate input variety. A vast body of literature has pointed out that local externalities
are an important determinant of firms’ performance.2 Externalities can be introduced in
the Lucas model as shifter of the distribution of talents that make on average individuals
more productive and therefore increase the share of agents that choose to start a business.
We show that the two assumptions have very contrasting implications regarding the
relation between the propensity of individuals to become entrepreneurs and their average
productivity: under entry costs differences, in areas with lower entry costs i) there should
be a larger share of entrepreneurs in the population, and ii) their firms’ average TFP should
be lower. Thus, in equilibrium there should be a negative correlation between the number
of firms in a given location (for a given population) and their TFP. On the contrary, with
externality differences, in places with stronger externalities average entrepreneurial ability
is higher and there are more entrepreneurs in relation to the population. In contrast with
heterogeneous entry costs, the model with heterogeneous externalities implies therefore that
in equilibrium there should be a positive correlation between the share of entrepreneurs in
a given location and their firms’ TFP.
We test these implications on a sample of Italian firms belonging to different clusters and
find that the data unambiguously reject the entry costs story and support the externality
one: areas with a higher share of firms in relation to the population are characterized by
an higher average productivity.
1Evans and Jovanovic (1989) show that wealthier individuals who are currently employees are more likely
than the less wealthy to become self-employed, a finding consistent with liquidity constraints. Blanchflower
and Oswald (1998) show that liquidity constraints affect the decision to become an entrepreneur even after
controlling for individual ability. More recently, Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004) using individual level
data for Italy find that in areas with a higher degree of financial development it is more likely that individuals
become entrepreneurs, the rate of firm creation is higher and there are more firms per inhabitant.
2See for example the contributions in the Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, vol. 4 (Henderson
and Thisse 2004).
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Based on this result, in the rest of the paper we investigate further the sources of such
externalities. Following Marshall (1890) and the literature on agglomeration economies, and
in particular Duranton and Puga (2004), we identify three different channels through which
agglomeration may affect firms’ productivity: first, the opportunities to learn from other
firms, either because of knowledge spillovers or through learning entrepreneurial abilities
from the observation of other firms; second, the size of the local work force, which can
increase the division of labor and the quality of job-worker matches; third, a greater variety
of intermediate inputs. To discriminate between these three sources of externalities we run
a horse race by constructing proxies for each one. As a proxy for learning opportunities
and knowledge spillovers we use the number of firms in a location, the idea being that more
firms offer more learning points; we proxy job-matching opportunities with the size of the
local workforce; intermediate inputs variety is measured by the ratio of intermediate inputs
to value added at the local level. We find strong evidence for the first channel, supporting
evidence for intermediate inputs variety and very week or no evidence for externalities
generated by labor pooling. In fact, the correlation between TFP and number of firms
proves to be extremely robust to a series of controls.
We further corroborate our interpretation of the number of firms in terms of learning
and knowledge spillovers. First, the findings are consistent with causality running from
the number of firms to productivity rather than the reflection of unobserved local factors
driving both productivity and the number of firms. In fact, when the number of firms is
instrumented with the local population in 1861, following an idea of Ciccone and Hall (1996),
the estimates are very similar to those obtained with OLS. Second, we directly test some
implications that are unique to the learning model. As predicted by the knowledge diffusion
models of Jovanovic and Rob (1989) and Eeckhout and Jovanovic (2002), learning should
be more relevant for small firms, and knowledge dispersion across firms should positively
affect the amount of spillovers, thus increasing productivity. Both predictions are supported
by the data.
This paper relates to three strands in the literature. First, it is connected with the
entrepreneurship literature: we sort out two alternative explanations of clusters. Second, it
contributes to the agglomeration literature: we investigate the sources of local externalities.
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Finally, it is related to the productivity literature. We provide evidence that differences
in firm-level TFP may be due to the differing ability of entrepreneurs, that in turn could
depend from the degree of knowledge spillovers.
Our results bear important policy implications. First, consistently with McKenzie and
Woodruff (2003) for Mexico, we de-emphasize entry costs in explaining regional differences
in entrepreneurial activity, adding an important element to the debate on the barriers to
entrepreneurship. Second, our findings indicate that the density of firms might be a funda-
mental driving force of local externalities. This result is not confined to Italy: Henderson
(2003) finds a positive effect of the number of plants at the local level on productivity in
the US.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out a simplified version of
the Lucas model with exogenous factor prices, extended to incorporate the cost of setting up
a firm. Exogenous and geographically heterogeneous costs of setting up a firm are a simple
way to generate clusters. We then introduce the possibility of that the original distribution
of talents can be shifted by a local externality and compare the predictions of this model
with those of the set-up-costs model. We then empirically contrast a number of testable
predictions from these two models, using Italian firm-level data matched with firm cluster
information and described in Section 3. Section 4 presents our basic results, showing that,
contrary to the pure set-up-costs model but in agreement with the externality model, entre-
preneurial ability is greater where there are more entrepreneurs over the local population,
and the probability mass on the left-hand side of the empirical ability distribution is lower
where there are more entrepreneurs. In Section 5 we explore the externality explanation
of the correlation between the mass of entrepreneurs and their quality, finding evidence for
a leaning externality. Section 6 extends the analysis to test some unique implications of
the learning model and runs a number of robustness checks. Section 7 summarizes and
concludes.
2 The model
We use a modified version of Lucas (1978) model of entrepreneurial ability. The economy
consists of N regions, within each of which firms produce output using labor (n) and capital
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(k); the prices of the two inputs, denoted respectively w and u, are exogenously given and
equal across regions. This assumption, which greatly simplifies the analysis, can be defended
on the grounds that in our empirical analysis the territorial units are small enough to assume
that they have no impact on aggregate factor prices and that factors are fully mobile.3 Our
conjecture is that with endogenous wages and user cost the results would still hold.
Given our partial equilibrium approach, we can confine the analysis to one representative
region. We modify the basic model of Lucas by introducing a start-up cost c which has to
be paid when becoming an entrepreneur. Individuals, who can be either entrepreneurs or
employees, differ in entrepreneurial talent x; the more talented can get more output from
a given combination of labor and capital if they choose to run a firm. Entrepreneurial
talents are drawn from a random variable
∼
x distributed according to a distribution function
γ(x) over the support (x, x), 0 ≤ x < x ≤ ∞, with corresponding cumulative distribution
function Γ(x). Output is produced according to the production function xg[f(n, k)], where
f is a constant returns to scale function and g is a concave transformation. Following Lucas,
we interpret this as the span of control. Define φ(r) = f(n, k)/n, where r = k/n. The first
order conditions for an entrepreneur who maximizes profits can be written as:
φ(r)− rφ′(r)
φ′(r)
=
w
u
(1)
xg′[nφ(r)]φ′(r) = u (2)
from which it is immediately evident that the capital/labor ratio does not depend on x.
The above FOCs give two equations in two unknowns, which can be solved implicitly to
obtain two-factor demand functions in terms of entrepreneurial ability: n(x), k(x). It is
immediately verifiable that n′(x) > 0, k′(x) > 0.
3Michelacci and Silva (2005) document that, in Italy, the share of entrepreneurs starting a business in the
locality where they were born is substantially higher than the corresponding share of employees, arguing that
becoming an entrepreneur requires some location-specific “relational” capital. This finding fully supports
our modelling assumptions.
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2.1 Start-up costs
We now depart from Lucas. When becoming an entrepreneur, the agent pays a cost c. The
profits of an entrepreneur of ability x before the entry cost are
pi(x) = xg[n(x)φ(r)]− n(x)[w + ur]. (3)
Using the optimal input choices condition (1) and (2), we get pi′(x) = g[n(x)φ(r)] > 0: the
profits of an entrepreneur are increasing with ability. An individual becomes an entrepreneur
if pi(x)− c ≥ w. Given that pi(x) is increasing, and that pi(0) = 0, there exists one and only
one value z at which the “marginal” individual is indifferent between being an entrepreneur
and an employee:
pi(z)− c = w (4)
which implicitly defines the ability threshold value z(c) above which it is optimal to become
an entrepreneur. In this economy, the mass of workers will be Γ(z) and that of entrepreneurs
(1− Γ(z)). By differentiating (4), we find that
dz
dc
=
1
pi′(z)
> 0 (5)
The higher the start-up cost, the greater the ability of the marginal entrepreneur.
How can this model generate different levels of entrepreneurial activity across regions?
A first possibility is that regions differ in terms of entry cost c, say because of differences
in bureaucratic costs due to disparate efficiency of the public administration. Areas with
lower costs will have a larger share of entrepreneurs:
d(1− Γ(z))
dc
= −γ(z)dz
dc
< 0 (6)
Define the average entrepreneurial quality as the expected value of x conditional on
being an entrepreneur:
E(x|x ≥ z) =
∫ x
z xγ(x)dx
1− Γ(z) . (7)
When c rises, the quality of the marginal entrepreneur increases, hence so does average
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entrepreneurial quality:
dE(x|z)
dc
=
[E(x|z)− z]γ(z)
[1− Γ(z)]
dz
dc
> 0 (8)
where, to facilitate notation, E(x|z) stands for E(x|x ≥ z). The inequality follows from
the fact that dzdc > 0 and E(x|x ≥ z) > z, where the last inequality formalizes the notion
that the marginal entrepreneur z is of lower quality than the average. Equations (6) and
(8) imply that if differences in the share of entrepreneurs across locations are explained by
entry costs, we should expect a negative correlation between the share of entrepreneurs and
their average quality.
We can obtain additional implications of heterogeneity in entry costs for the distribution
of entrepreneurial ability. Define Ω(y|z) as the cumulative density function of the random
variable obtained by truncating x at z:
Ω(y|z) =

Γ(y)−Γ(z)
1−Γ(z)
0
if y ≥ z
otherwise
(9)
Ω(y|z) is the share of entrepreneurs below any given level of ability y. As c increases, this
share falls:
dΩ(y|z)
dc
= −γ(z)(1− Γ(y))
(1− Γ(z))2
dz
dc
< 0 (10)
This implies that heterogeneous entry costs induce a positive correlation of the share of
entrepreneurs below any given level of ability with the overall mass of entrepreneurs, and a
negative correlation above that level.
Summing up, heterogeneity in entry costs generates two sharp predictions: a larger
mass of entrepreneurs should be associated with i) lower overall quality and ii) with a
larger (smaller) share of entrepreneurs below (above) any quality level.
2.2 Local externalities
A second potential reason for different levels of entrepreneurial activity across locations is
that the distribution of entrepreneurial skills is different, due in particular to local external-
ities. For example, in some locations the diffusion of knowledge and ideas is facilitated by
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environmental factors. As shown by Jovanovic and Rob (1989), the easier the circulation
of knowledge the higher entrepreneurial quality. To model this possibility and derive its
implications, we assume that the distribution of talent is parameterized by a shift factor λ,
specific to each location: x ∼ γ(., λ), with Γ(x, λ) representing the cumulative distribution
function. The parameter λ measures the intensity of local externalities. We assume that
∂Γ/∂λ < 0: λ shifts the probability distribution to the right in the first order stochastic
dominance sense. In this setting, clusters arise in areas with high λ:
d(1− Γ(z, λ))
dλ
= −∂Γ(z, λ)
∂λ
> 0. (11)
Equation (11) implies that the higher λ, the larger the share of individuals with a given
talent above the threshold z, and so the larger the mass of entrepreneurs.
As before, we define average entrepreneurial quality as the expected value of x condi-
tional on being an entrepreneur. This value will now depend on λ:
E(x|z, λ) =
∫ x
z xγ(x, λ)dx
1− Γ(z, λ) . (12)
The effect of a change in λ on average entrepreneurial quality is:
dE(x|z, λ)
dλ
=
[
∫ x
z x
∂γ
∂λdx− E(x|z, λ)∂(1−Γ(z,λ))∂λ ]
(1− Γ(z, λ)) (13)
Given that the first term is positive4 and the second negative, this expression cannot be
signed a priori. In fact, an increase in λ has two contrasting effects on average ability: on one
side, for given z, it shifts ability to the right, i.e. increases average ability; on the other, some
agents that would have been employees for a lower λ now become entrepreneurs. Given that
they enter at the lower end of the talent distribution, more ‘entry’ implies that quality is
diluted, thus reducing average quality - the second term in square brackets in (13). The sign
of dE(x|z,λ)dλ depends on the shape of the distribution of talents and on how λ parametrizes
it. However, dE(x|z,λ)dλ > 0 holds for a general family of distributions, the log-concave
4Using the property of first order stochastic dominance, it can be shown that
R x
z
x ∂γ
∂λ
dx > 0. In fact, for
dλ > 0, stochastic dominance implies that
R x
z
xγ(x, λ+ dλ)dx >
R x
z
xγ(x, λ)dx. Grouping terms and taking
the limit for dλ→ 0 delivers the result.
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distributions (Barlow and Proschan 1975).5 This family of distributions includes, among
others, the uniform, the normal and the exponential. For such distributions, a positive
correlation between the share of entrepreneurs and their average quality will emerge.6
The same reasoning applies to the distribution of entrepreneurial talents conditional on
x ≥ z, Ω(x|z, λ): as before, while not determined a priori, the mass of entrepreneurs with
talent below (above) an arbitrary threshold y, Ω(y|z, λ) can decrease (increase) with the
density of firms. Therefore, with externalities, under mild conditions on the distribution
function Γ there is a positive relation between the overall share of entrepreneurs and their
quality.
To sum up, a model with different entry costs predicts a negative correlation between the
number of entrepreneurs and their quality, while a model with externalities is compatible
with a positive correlation. We confront the implications of the models with the data in
the subsequent sections.
3 Data description
We test our propositions drawing on a dataset of Italian firms, the Company Accounts
Data Service (in Italian, “Centrale dei Bilanci”, CB), which provides standardized data
on the balance sheets and income statements of about 30,000 Italian non-financial firms
plus information on employment and firm characteristics. Data, available since 1982, are
collected by a consortium of banks interested in pooling information about their clients. A
firm is included if it borrows from a bank in the consortium. The focus on level of borrowing
skews the sample towards larger firms. Furthermore, because most of the large banks are
in the northern part of the country, the sample has more firms headquartered in the North
than in the South. Finally, since banks are interested in creditworthy firms, those in default
are not included, so the sample is biased towards better-quality borrowers. Despite these
biases, previous comparisons with population moments indicate that the sample is not too
far from being representative; moreover, it covers more than half of private sector sales
5A function h is said to be log-concave if its logarithm lnh is concave, that is if h′′(x)h(x)− h′(x)2 ≤ 0.
6The log-normal, traditionally used to model firm size (Steindl 1990) and income distribution (Harrison
1981), does not satisfy this property. Some simulations indicate that even for this distribution the above
condition will generically be satisfied, implying that average ability increases with the number of firms.
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(Guiso and Schivardi 2005). Table 1, Panel A, gives summary statistics on employment,
value added and the stock of capital at constant prices for the 1991 CB sample comprising
16,885 observations; we use 1991 as the reference year for our regressions but check for
robustness when all the available years are used. Data are reported by industrial sector
using a 10-industry classification; to avoid the usual problems of estimating productivity in
services we have restricted the analysis to manufacturing.7 The capital stock is constructed
using the permanent inventory method with sectoral deflator and depreciation rates (see
Cingano and Schivardi (2004) for details).
We complement the CB data with another dataset on Italian industrial clusters, the
Local Labor Systems dataset. The territory of Italy has been divided by the National
Statistical Institute (ISTAT) into 784 local labor systems (LLS) on the basis of working-
day commuting areas.8 The idea behind the algorithm is to define self-contained labor
markets in terms of worker mobility. As such, this is the correct geographical boundary for
an environment within which learning takes place and learning relations are formed. Since
the Data Services gives the firm’s LLS code, we can match firms with the corresponding
LLS. The resident population of each LLS comes from the census while the number of
manufacturing firms in the LLS is obtained from the files of the Italian Social Security
Administration (INPS) on the population of firms with at least one employee for the years
1986-98. With respect to CB, the information on firms is much less detailed: for example,
output is not reported so that TFP cannot be computed. For our purposes, the database
contains the number of employees, the sector and the location of each firm, from which very
precise measures of industrial density at the local and sectoral level can be constructed.
Panel B shows summary statistics on the average number of firms per LLS for each of our
10 industries. It is clear that there is considerable geographical variation in the clustering
of industry: for all industries, there are 92 firms per LLS with a standard deviation almost
7As will become clear in the next subsection, the sectoral classification balances the need for homogeneity
of the production technology and that of a sufficient number of sectoral observations to properly estimate
TFP.
8Even if defined using the same criteria (commuting ties), the concept of LLS differs from US Core
Based Statistical Areas since there is no minimum population requirement. Hence, like the French “zones
d’emploi”, the Italian LLS entirely and continuously cover the national territory. The average land-area is
384 square kilometers, with a population density of 188 inhabitants per sq. km. Population ranges from
3,000 in the smallest LLS to 3.3 million in the largest.
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three times the mean (269) and range of 1-8,392. Figure 1 gives a visual picture of the
geographical clustering of entrepreneurship and its dispersion across local labor systems.
Although the largest clusters are mostly in the North, there are several in the South.
However, to make sure that our results are not driven by North-South differences, in our
empirical analysis we always include area dummies.
3.1 Estimating entrepreneurial ability
In order to test the two alternative models described in Section 2 first we need a measure
of entrepreneurial ability at the firm level. In Lucas, entrepreneurial ability is modeled
as a shift in the production function: better entrepreneurs will get more output from any
combination of inputs. Put in this way, entrepreneurial ability is simply equivalent to
a firm’s TFP. If this were the only feature affecting a firm’s TFP, Lucas’s model might
serve as the basis for a theory of TFP, or at least of its dispersion across firms. The
main limit of this theory is that the dispersion is simply assumed and inherited from the
differences in entrepreneurial ability, which is taken as given. Our model of externalities
is a way of providing a basis for an endogenous explanation of firm-specific TFP and the
determinants of differences in average TFP across locations. To compute the contribution
of entrepreneurial ability to TFP we assume that a firm’s TFP has two components: one
is common to all firms in the same industry and depends on their specific technology. The
second is firm-specific, and in the spirit of our model we assume it reflects the ability of the
firm’s entrepreneur.
To obtain an estimate of the TFP of firm i we assume that output is produced with a
Cobb-Douglas production function of the form Ysi = xsiAs ∗ Kαi Lβi , where s indexes the
industry, Y is output, and K and L denote the stock of capital and labor services. TFP
is given by TFPsi = xsiAs , and is the product of the sectoral component, A, and the
firm-specific component, x. The latter is our measure of entrepreneurial ability. To obtain
an estimate of TFP we need to compute values for α and β. To obtain estimates of the
production function parameters that are robust to the endogeneity of some of the inputs
(capital accumulation and labor demand may respond to unobserved productivity shocks)
and the selection induced by exit (with some irreversibility, leaving the industry is more
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likely for firms with a lower capital stock when a bad productivity shock occurs) we use
the multi-step estimation algorithm proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996), which accounts
for both problems, allowing for consistent and unconstrained estimation of αs and βs.9
To assess the reliability of the estimates, we also calculate the coefficients using Solow’s
assumptions.
Table 2 reports the estimated values of αs and βs with the two procedures. Production
function estimates of (αs + βs) lie in the range 0.93-1.05. The model assumes decreasing re-
turns to scale to avoid a degenerate equilibrium in which there exists only one firm supplying
the whole market. Given that the capital coefficient is estimated using a semi-parametric
procedure, we obtained its standard errors through a bootstrapping exercise based on 150
replications. As in Olley and Pakes (1996), standard errors are relatively large10 and, given
that the estimates of (αs + βs) are always somewhere around 1, the empirical model has no
power to discriminate between different degrees of returns to scale. Formally, the null hy-
pothesis (αs + βs) < 1 is never rejected in a one-sided test even at the 10 per cent confidence
level.11 In terms of single coefficients, compared with Solow’s method the Olley and Pakes
(1996) procedure tends to result in a higher coefficient for labor and a lower one for capital,
arguably because of deviations of the factor markets from the competitive paradigm; apart
from these differences, the two methods give broadly consistent results. In what follows, we
use the TFP estimates obtained with the Olley and Pakes procedure to recover our measure
of entrepreneurial ability.
Table 3 describes the distribution of our estimate of x, obtained by removing the
industry-level component with a first-stage regression of estimated TFP on a set of in-
dustry dummies. To account for possible outliers we drop observations in the first and last
percentile of the ability distribution by year-sector. The sample mean of entrepreneurial
9To summarize, the procedure controls for endogeneity by approximating the unobserved productivity
shocks with a non-parametric function of observable variables and for selection by introducing a Heckman-
type correction term.
10Pakes and Olley (1995) discuss the asymptotic properties of the estimator, suggesting that the bootstrap-
ping procedure might overestimate the true standard deviation of the capital coefficient, partially explaining
why its values are higher than those for labor.
11Indeed, returns to scale might be initially increasing, due for example to fixed production costs, so that
the “span of control” only kicks in for larger levels of operation. In fact, some small, growing firms might
still be on the increasing part of the production function but, due to convex costs of adjusting the scale of
operation, might not immediately exploit the full advantages of scale.
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ability is 2.35 but there is considerable dispersion, as the high value of the standard de-
viation (0.5) implies. When the sample is split according to the density of firms in each
geographical unit, entrepreneurial ability is higher where firms’ density is above median
than where it is below median (2.39 compared to 2.20), which is inconsistent with the start-
up cost hypothesis but not with externalities. The table also shows the share of firms with
ability below the 25th and above the 75th percentile both for the total sample and the two
sub-samples of high-density and low-density areas. Contrary to the start-up cost model,
there is a larger frequency mass to the left of the lower threshold in places with fewer firms
(36 per cent in the low-density group compared with 22 per cent among the high-density
locations) while in accordance with the externalities hypothesis the probability mass to the
right of the upper threshold (the 75th percentile ) is greater where there are more firms for
given population. Thus, the descriptive evidence clearly rejects the start-up cost theory in
favor of externalities. The same conclusions can be drawn from Figure 2, which shows the
distribution of entrepreneurial ability for firms in high-density and low-density local labor
systems, computed using Gaussian kernel non-parametric smoothers evaluated at 25 points
over the range of x. Notably, the distribution of entrepreneurial ability is shifted to the right
in areas with a high density of firms, implying that entrepreneurs in high-density areas have
greater ability. In the following sections we refine this descriptive evidence using formal re-
gressions testing for statistical significance and controlling for any additional effects. Table
2 also reports summary statistics for some of these controls, such as the number of firms
in the LLS and that in the LLS and industry, the number of workers in the LLS and the
cumulated stock of capital in the LLS. Not surprisingly, in high-density areas there are also
more workers and capital stock is larger.
4 Start-up costs or externalities? Testing the two models
According to equations (6) and (8), the start-up cost model implies that as we vary entry
costs, entrepreneurial ability and the mass of entrepreneurs should move in opposite direc-
tions. Under reasonable assumptions, the externalities model implies a positive correlation
between the two variables. Table 4 reports our basic test; the left-hand side is the log of
our estimate of entrepreneurial ability (x in the model); on the right-hand side we include
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the share of entrepreneurs, i.e. the ratio between the number of firms, obtained from the
yearly INPS archives, and the resident population in the local labor system, obtained from
the population census (1−Γ(z) in the model), a variable we call Entrepreneurial Incidence
(EI). We also include as controls three geographical dummies for the Centre, Northeast and
Northwest of the country (the South is the omitted region). Given that the independent
variable only varies across LLS-year, we use standard errors adjusted for clustering. To
check the robustness of our results, we use three different samples: a single cross section in
1991, which is the Census year when the population is counted; the de-trended firm average
over the entire period12 and the full panel with year dummies. The first column shows the
estimates using the 1991 cross-section; the correlation between EI and TFP is positive and
statistically significant at 10%; to give a sense of its magnitude, an increase in EI of one
standard deviation would bring about an increase in TFP of a little more than 2%. Using
firm averages and pooled data (columns 2 and 3), the estimates are slightly higher and
much more precise. This clearly contradicts the start–up cost model of cluster formation
already questioned by the previous descriptive evidence. This result is very robust across
specifications.
To control for unobserved factors at the local level, we run the regressions including
province dummies, a very fine geographical control.13 The coefficient is slightly lower, an
indication of possible spatially correlated effects, but still positive and statistically signifi-
cant in two cases out of three.
The second panel of Table 4 sharpens the evidence on the validity of the start-up cost
theory by looking at the relations between the number of firms in a cluster and the share
with ability below a lower bound or above an upper one. According to this model, there
should be a positive (negative) correlation between the number of firms and the frequency
of firms with ability below (above) a certain bound. The intuition is that as the start-
up cost declines and the number of firms increases, the new entrants are of lower quality,
so there is a larger (smaller) mass of entrepreneurs with ability below (above) any given
12According to Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004), the serial correlation in the independent variable
can make inference problematic. As a simple solution, they propose running estimates on the collapsed data
and ignoring the time series variation.
13Italy has 103 provinces, so that there are 8 LLS per province.
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threshold. To test this implication we set the lower bound at the 25th (and the upper at
the 75th) percentile of the empirical distribution of ability and construct an indicator that
is equal to 1 if the firm’s specific ability is below (above) the threshold. We then run a
probit estimate on the entrepreneurial share and the geographical controls. The first three
columns of Table 4 show the results for the share above the 25th percentile for the three
samples, using macro areas as geographical controls. They reveal a negative correlation,
with highly significant coefficients. This pattern is broadly confirmed when provinces are
used as geographical controls (last three columns). The last panel shows the share of firms
above the 75th percentile, finding a positive coefficient of the number of firms scaled by
population, albeit significant only for the pooled sample. Taken together, these findings
suggest that a larger share of firms is associated with a shift to the right in the distribution
of entrepreneurial talent. Thus, the two main implications of the start-up cost model are
strongly rejected by the data. On the other hand, they are consistent with externalities,
which (under mild conditions) not only predict a positive correlation between ability and
the share of entrepreneurs in the population, but also a negative correlation between the
share of firms with ability below a lower bound and the entrepreneurial share in a cluster
(and vice versa for the right tail).
The evidence in Table 4 is unequivocal: it strongly rejects theories of cluster formation
based only on differences in entry and start-up costs, such as differences in the fixed costs or
bureaucratic steps required to organize a firm. It lends support to models that emphasize
differences in the distribution of entrepreneurial abilities due to local externalities.
To further strengthen our interpretation, we consider the correlation between EI and
TFP at the local sectoral level. If differences in entrepreneurial incidence are due to entry
costs, then they should apply independently of the sector of activity, so that the correlation
should arise at the aggregate level.14 Instead, we should expect externalities to have a strong
sectoral component.15 In fact, entrepreneurship entails some degree of specificity. Thus,
14This is not to say that entry costs are equal across industries. Rather, it means that if two locations
differ in the level of such costs, the differential effect on EI should be uniform across industries.
15There is a large literature on the relative importance of intra-industry and inter-industry spillovers, which
has so far failed to reach a clear consensus, even if the intra-industry component tends to be important in
most empirical studies (Rosenthal and Strange 2004). Using the same dataset as in this paper, Cingano and
Schivardi (2004) find evidence in favor of intra-industry spillovers, and no evidence of inter-industry.
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if externalities are more important within an industry than across industries (due to some
kind of specificity), then the correlation between the share of firms and entrepreneurial
ability should be stronger in the same LLS and industry than overall. This is tested in
Table 5, where we insert both the overall entrepreneurial share and that at the sectoral
level, i.e. calculated using the number of firms in an LLS-industry. The first panel shows
the results for the correlation between ability and the two indexes of entrepreneurial share.
We always find that the effect is stronger and the significance higher for the industry-level
index, independently of sample and type of geographical controls.
The second and third panels report the regressions for the probability that the firm has a
specific component of TFP below the 25th percentile of the distribution (Panel B) and above
the 75th percentile (Panel C). The pattern is very similar to that found in Panel A, with two
exceptions for the first indicator, for which the overall share is sometimes significant. All in
all, the evidence suggests that location-industry factors underlie the correlation, consistently
with the externalities hypothesis and at odds with the idea that some locations have more
firms because of lower start-up costs.
5 Which externalities?
Up to now, we have used the model to obtain equilibrium correlations between EI and
ability, without any causal interpretation. We now take a further step and investigate the
causes. In practice, by log linearizing (12), we can immediately verify that this amounts to
identifying some measurable factors that shift the ability distribution (the variable λ in the
model) and to running a regression of (log) ability on the (log) indicator of λ. The logical
candidate to explain productivity differences according to density is local externalities. In
this section, therefore, we contrast different sources of externalities to look for more direct
evidence that can sort out their nature.
There is a large theoretical literature on agglomeration economies (see Duranton and
Puga (2004) for a recent survey). This literature has maintained the original Marshallian
idea (Marshall 1890) that the spatial concentration of production can be beneficial for three
reasons. First, concentration fosters the circulation of ideas and the possibility of learning
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from other agents.16 Second, a large concentration of workers in the same industry can
have beneficial effects both in terms of the specialization that each worker can achieve
and the quality of worker/job matches. Third, industrial clusters offer a wide variety of
intermediate inputs, with potentially beneficial effects on productivity.17 The empirical
literature on the extent and scope of agglomeration economies suggests that localization
economies are important. However, a consensus has not yet emerged on the relative merits
of the different sources and investigation is continuing (see Rosenthal and Strange (2004)
for an exhaustive assessment of the state of the empirical debate).
We distinguish among these different effects by proposing a proxy of each potential
externality. To proxy for learning externalities we use the number of firms operating in
a given industry and in a given area. If learning entrepreneurial abilities is not, as we
think, a routine activity, then an obvious feature facilitating learning is the number of firms
in a given location. If learning takes place mainly on the job and on the site, a larger
number of firms offers more (and better) opportunities to acquire entrepreneurial abilities,
since a potential entrepreneur can compare different working practices and business idea,
possibly by working in different firms.18 Moreover, the process of knowledge acquisition
continues even after the business is started, because knowledge spillovers on alternative
technologies or new markets keep accruing in regions with a large population of firms. The
availability of intermediate inputs - the second reason why spatial concentration can raise
firms’ productivity - is easily measured by the ratio of intermediate inputs to value added
at the local sectoral level. In fact, if greater concentration leads to higher productivity
16Guiso and Schivardi (2005) show that information flows are an important determinant for firms’ em-
ployment choices in Italian industrial districts.
17Marshall (1890) wrote: “When an industry has thus chosen a locality for itself, it is likely to stay there
long: so great are the advantages which people following the same skilled trade get from neighborhood to
one another. The mysteries of trade become no mysteries; but are as in the air, and children learn many
of them unconsciously.... Employers are apt to resort to any place where they are likely to find a good
choice of workers with the special skill which they require. .. The advantages of variety of employment are
combined with those of localized industries in some of our manufacturing towns, and this is a chief cause of
their continued economic growth”.
18According to Saxenian (1994), the mobility of workers across firms and their acquired capacity to start
up new firms was one of the main reasons behind the success of Silicon Valley during the technology boom.
This would also be consistent with the model and the empirical evidence of Lazear (2005), according to
which the probability of becoming an entrepreneur is positively related to the number of tasks a worker is
previously exposed to, because the entrepreneur needs to be able to understand and coordinate different
activities: again, more firms could offer better opportunities of learning the complex set of skills required to
manage a firm.
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through more reliance on intermediate inputs,19 we should find that TFP is positively
related to this indicator. The third reason, labor market pooling effect, is measured by the
number of workers operating in a given LLS-sector. Summary statistics for these variables
are reported in Table 3.
In Table 6, Panel A, we regress firm-level TFP on the number of firms, the share of
intermediate inputs over value added and the number of workers in the LLS-industry (all
variables are in logs).20 With four spatial controls, we find that the number of firms has
a positive and significant coefficient in all specifications, with a value of around 0.05. The
share of intermediate inputs is not significantly different from zero in the cross-sections,
but is significant when using averaged data and in the pooled data, and thus there are
indications that the availability of intermediate inputs might also foster local productivity,
though the evidence is less clear-cut than for the number of firms. The number of workers is
never significant, save in one case. The exception is the pooled data with 4 spatial controls,
and its negative coefficient is at odds with the idea that local externalities are attributable
to labor market pooling effects. To give a sense of the magnitude of these effects, using
the pooled estimate of column 3 we calculate that increasing the number of firms by one
standard deviation would bring about an increase in firms’ productivity of about 9 per
cent, which is quite large; doing the same with intermediate input intensity would increase
TFP by a more modest 1.2 per cent. The last three columns of Table 6 repeat the exercise
with 103 spatial controls (the provinces). The estimates for the number of firms and the
intermediate inputs become somewhat smaller, but remain highly significant. The number
of workers has no effect in any specification.
These patterns are confirmed by the analysis of the TFP percentiles. The second panel
shows the regressions for the probability that the firm-specific component of TFP falls below
the 25th percentile of the distribution. The number of firms has a negative effect, as predicted
by the learning model, and its coefficient is statistically significant in all specifications.
The intermediate input indicator is also negative, although again less precisely estimated,
19Using US data, Holmes (1999) finds that sectoral concentration at the local level is positively related to
intermediate input intensity, although the effect is rather modest.
20While the number of firms and that of workers can be computed from the INPS dataset, and therefore
cover the respective populations, we have information on intermediate inputs and value added only for the
CB sample, which is therefore used to compute the measure of intermediate input intensity.
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and the labor market pooling indicator is marginally significant in only one case. The
last panel shows the estimates for the probability that firm-specific TFP exceeds the 75th
percentile of the distribution, with results very much in line with the previous ones. Here,
the intermediate inputs indicator is always significant while the number of workers is either
insignificant or negative.
All in all, we conclude that the evidence supports both learning externalities and inter-
mediate input variety, with the former playing a more prominent role. Controlling for these
sources, no evidence of labor market pooling emerges.
6 Robustness and further implications
Having established that the number of firms is strongly correlated with firm-level TFP,
we further investigate if we can correctly interpret this correlation as evidence in favor of
learning externalities, as suggested above.
6.1 Unobserved heterogeneity
The OLS correlations face the endogeneity problem that plagues the empirical analysis of
density and productivity. There could in fact be unobserved local factors, not accounted for
by our geographical controls, as even the finer ones (the province dummies) refer to wider
areas than the Local Labor System. For example, politicians might care about places with a
high production density and provide business-oriented public goods, such as infrastructure,
which raise productivity. While the province dummies absorb some of these effects, the
transfers could take place at an even finer geographical level, leaving the regression residual
correlated with a firm TFP. We address this issue in two ways. First, since in the estimates in
Table 6 our regressors vary with the LLS and the industry, we can exploit the cross-industry
variation while inserting geographical controls at the LLS level. In Table 7 we report the
same regressions as in the previous one, adding dummies for the 784 LLS dummies. We
find results that are similar to those of Table 6 with province dummies, losing significance
only in the case of the cross-section sample. Similar conclusions are reached with the probit
estimates in Panel B and C. Indeed, in a similar vain, Henderson (2003) finds a positive
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and robust correlation between number of plants and productivity in the US.21 His findings
therefore suggest that the correlation we find is not confined to Italy.
Second, we provide instrumental variables estimates. As an instrument for the number
of firms, we need a variable that is correlated with the number of firms in a location but
not with firm-level productivity in our sample. Following Ciccone and Hall (1996), we use
as instrument the population at the LLS level in 1861 (the first Italian census). Clearly,
the larger the population in a given location, the larger the number of firms, even if the
primitive distribution of abilities is the same across areas. Moreover, given that location
choices are persistent, due to moving costs and preference for “home”, it can be maintained
that population in 1861 is correlated with population today and thus with today’s mass
of firms. Indeed, a regression of the log of number of firms at the LLS-industry level on
the population in 1861 at the LLS level produces an R2 of 0.4. On the other hand, it
is reasonable that local population size in the mid- 19th century is not correlated with
potential determinants of productivity in manufacturing over our sample period. This is
our identifying assumption; it can be defended on the grounds that the industrial revolution
in Italy did not even begin until the 1890s and that the biggest wave of industrialization
occurred in the 1950s. If we presume that location choices before the industrial revolution
were dictated mainly by agricultural fertility, and that this has no obvious relation to
productivity in manufacturing in the later 20th century, then the instrument satisfies the
exogeneity condition.
Table 8 reports the results of a regression of firm efficiency on the number of firms in
the LLS-sector, estimated by OLS (first three columns) and by IV (last three columns). For
brevity, we only report the results with using provincial dummies as geographical controls.
In Panel B and C we estimate a linear probability model to avoid the problems of IV
estimates with probit models. All the regressions indicate that OLS and IV estimates are
highly similar, with no evidence of a systematic bias in the OLS regressions. This suggests
that our geographical controls are fine enough to capture any local factor that affects firms’
21Henderson’s paper belongs to the literature assessing the industrial scope of spillovers, i.e. whether they
are within or between industries, and he uses the number of own-industry plants as a measure of industrial
concentration. Given that he does not aim at separating different sources of externalities, unlike us he does
not control for the alternative channels. In line with what we find, he claims that the number of plants is the
most robust indicator of intra-industry spillovers, and interprets it as evidence of knowledge externalities.
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TFP and could be correlated with the number of firms in the area, lending support to our
causal interpretation.
We have also performed robustness checks along the industry dimension. First, the
two-digit classification we use might be too coarse and mix industries with different char-
acteristics. While a more refined analysis is difficult because of limited sample size, partic-
ularly in the estimate of the production function coefficients, we can increase the number
of industry controls in the baseline regression. We have run the basic regression on the
pooled data including 296 dummies at the 4-digit level, finding no substantial difference
in the estimates. A second problem is that we impose the same coefficient for the number
of firms across different industries. While assessing learning opportunities at the industry
level is beyond the scope of this paper, we have run a separate regression for each industry.
In all industries we find that the number of firms has a positive and significant effect on
TFP, with coefficients ranging from a low of 0.017 for basic metal to a high of 0.067 for
leather and footwear.
6.2 Is the number of firms proxing for learning opportunities?
In this subsection we further corroborate the interpretation in terms of learning oppor-
tunities and knowledge spillovers. For example, the number of firms could be a proxy for
competition, which would increase the productivity of the survivors through selection.22 For
learning externalities, we rely on specific theoretical predictions. Unfortunately, as noted
by Duranton and Puga (2004), rigorous theoretical work on knowledge spillovers is rather
scant. To our knowledge, Jovanovic and Rob (1989) and Eeckhout and Jovanovic (2002)
are the only models that offer testable theoretical predictions.23 The key to these models
is that learning requires differences in knowledge among agents: if everybody knows the
same thing, then there is no benefit from knowledge diffusion. This idea has two important
22This effect is often referred to in the literature as the “Porter effect”, following Porter (1990) who studies
the highly competitive and successful tile industry centered around Bologna in Italy. Syverson (2005) builds
a model of the selection effect based on demand density and transportation costs, and tests it with data for
the ready-mix concrete industry in the US, finding supporting evidence. A similar effect also emerges in the
matching model of Lagos (2004).
23A related literature studies the diffusion of skills at the worker level - see Moretti (2004) for a survey.
By studying the evolution of migrants’ wages, Glaeser and Mare´ (2001) find evidence that cities favour the
accumulation of human capital rather than simply increase individual productivity due to some thick-market
externality.
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implications that we can easily test with our data:
1. The least informed agents should gain more from spillovers, i.e. their productivity
should be more sensitive to the amount of knowledge that can be accessed locally;
2. The dispersion of knowledge among firms should have a positive impact on produc-
tivity, because there is more to gain from knowledge diffusion.
We can test the first prediction by allowing the coefficient of the number of firms (our
measure of potentially accessible knowledge) to differ across firms with different levels of
knowledge. We therefore interact the number of firms with a dummy variable (“small”) that
is equal to 1 if the firm’s capital stock is below the sample median, calculated at the LLS-
industry level in each year, and add this interaction term to the regressions. The results,
reported in Table 9, are strongly supportive of this prediction. In the OLS regressions, the
elasticity of TFP to the number of firms is between 50 and 100 per cent higher for small
firms across the different specifications. The increase in the estimates is very similar for the
probability of being above the 75th percentile and only slightly smaller (in absolute terms)
for that of being below the 25th percentile. Remarkably, the difference is significant at 1
percent in all 18 specifications, an indication of its robustness.24
To test the second implication, we need a measure of knowledge at the firm level. Fol-
lowing Eeckhout and Jovanovic (2002), we use the capital stock as a proxy of firm-level
knowledge. First, the stock of capital is a measure of size, and it is reasonable to assume
that larger firms have a higher stock of knowledge; second, insofar as knowledge is embodied
in capital, it will be captured by this measure. We compute the standard deviation of the
capital stock at the level of LLS-industry in each year, and use its log as an additional
regressor. Table 10 reports the results of this set of exercises. For the OLS regressions,
we find an elasticity of TFP to knowledge dispersion of about 0.04 (with higher values for
the pooled regressions) and high levels of statistical significance. This finding is confirmed
by the probit estimate, again more markedly for the probability of being above the 75th
24As a further unreported check, we have also used an interaction between the capital stock and the
number of firms, to avoid the arbitrariness of the split point of the regressions in Table 9. We find that the
interaction is always negative (positive for the probability of being below the 25th percentile), indicating
that the larger the firm’s stock of knowledge is the smaller is the effect of the number of firms.
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percentile of the TFP distribution.
We have experimented with different measures of dispersion, using the ratio of the 90th
to the 10th percentile of the capital stock, controlling for outliers and using a different
functional form (i.e. in levels rather than in log), and alternative measures of firms’ size,
such as employment level. Again, results proved to be remarkably robust to all these
changes. We conclude that, in line with theoretical predictions, knowledge dispersion has
a positive effect on TFP. This is consistent with higher productivity levels being related
to knowledge spillovers and learning externalities, and at odds with the competition effect,
which should imply a negative impact of dispersion on productivity.
Taken together, the empirical exercises provide a compelling argument that differences
in productivity across locations are at least partly due to the different learning opportunities
and knowledge spillovers.
7 Conclusions
This paper has compared two alternative theoretical models of cluster formation, one based
on the cost of setting up a business and another on local externalities. These models carry
opposite implications on the sign of the correlation between entrepreneurial ability and
entrepreneurial incidence, defined as number of firms over total population. This relation
is negative if geographical agglomeration of firms is due to start-up costs and positive if it
is due to differences in externalities. The models have also clear-cut implications for the
relation between entrepreneurial incidence and the frequency mass at the two tails of the
ability distribution. We have confronted these theoretical predictions with data on a large
sample of Italian manufacturing firms coupled with information on the geographical clusters
the firms belong to. We have found overwhelmingly that the start-up cost model is rejected
and the externalities hypothesis supported.
When exploring the sources of externalities, we have found supporting evidence for
intermediate input variety and especially for knowledge spillovers. We have indeed shown
that the data agree with specific predictions of knowledge spillovers models. In future work
we plan to investigate the modes through which they take place, focussing in particular
on the possibility that in some locations in might be easier to accumulate entrepreneurial
23
skills.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for 1991
Panel A: Firms’ characteristics (CB data)
Industry Value added No. employees Capital Stock No. obs.
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
1 F 4856 20727 96 397 9891 35821 1367
2 T&C 2823 8183 83 230 4287 10282 2196
3 L&F 1659 2652 54 93 1611 3042 773
4 W&C 1786 2487 56 68 3130 5918 1110
5 T&Gl 4036 10981 87 201 9854 37443 1190
6 BM 6723 47871 162 1109 17499 118693 666
7 Mach 4487 27909 112 463 5739 42705 5262
8 Chem 7448 27959 129 461 14878 79981 1892
9 P&P 4454 15941 92 306 7404 29249 934
10 TEq 21021 174741 595 5172 38613 382168 447
Total 4840 37277 114 969 8433 80014 15837
Panel B: Number of firms by LLS-industry (INPS data)
Industry Average S.D. Max Min .
1 F 62.5 89.7 722 1
2 T&C 150.5 270.4 2501 2
3 L&F 94.6 173.7 1159 1
4 W&C 89.3 148.3 1529 2
5 T 38.2 53.8 391 1
6 BM 21.1 48.6 374 1
7 Mach 234.2 568.0 8392 1
8 Chem 44.4 113.1 1636 1
9 P&P 71.5 221.4 2556 1
10 Teq 13.0 21.2 166 1
Total 92.1 269.3 8392 1
Note: Value added and the stock of capital are in thousands of euros (at 1991 prices). Sectoral
classification: F=Food, beverages and tobacco; T&C=Textiles and clothing; L&F= Leather and
footwear W&C=Wood, products of wood and cork; T&Gl=Timber, construction materials and
glass; BM=Basic metals; Mach=Metal products, machinery and equipment; Chem=Rubber, plastic
and chemical products; P&P=Paper, printing and publishing; TEq=Transportation equipment
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Table 2: Production function coefficients: factor share and direct estimates
Industry Factor shares Direct estimates
β α β α α+ β
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
1 F 0.56 0.44
.63∗∗∗
(.005)
0.39∗∗∗
(.066)
1.02
(.064)
2 T&C 0.60 0.40
0.58∗∗∗
(.003)
0.37∗∗∗
(.035)
0.95
(.036)
3 L&F 0.61 0.39
0.62∗∗∗
(.005)
0.43∗∗∗
(.091)
1.05
(.091)
4 W&C 0.63 0.37
0.70∗∗∗
(.005)
0.35∗∗∗
(.077)
1.05
(.076)
5 T&Gl 0.58 0.42
0.67
∗∗∗
(.005)
0.37∗∗∗
(.080)
1.04
(.078)
6 BM 0.65 0.35
0.60∗∗∗
(.007)
0.33∗∗∗
(.057)
0.93
(.054)
7 Mach 0.67 0.33
0.72∗∗∗
(.002)
0.28∗∗∗
(.013)
1.00
(.012)
8 Chem 0.60 0.40
0.70∗∗∗
(.004)
0.29∗∗∗
(.044)
0.99
(.043)
9 P&P 0.66 0.34
0.72∗∗∗
(.005)
0.32∗∗∗
(.039)
1.04
(.035)
10 TEq 0.74 0.26
0.70∗∗∗
(.008)
0.26∗
(.144)
0.96
(.144)
Note: α is the capital coefficient and β the labor coefficient. The first estimates use the traditional
Solow approach, the second the direct estimation of the production function coefficients using the
Olley and Pakes (1996) procedure. Standard errors in parenthesis. Standard errors for the capital
coefficient and for the sum of the coefficients computed by a bootstrapping procedure based on 150
replications. In column 4 and 5, *** indicates significance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10% (assuming
normality for the bootstrapped standard errors). In column 6, the null H0 : α + β = 1 is never
rejected at standard significance levels. See Table 1 for the industry labels.
28
Table 3: Ability and other characteristics by density of LLS
Variable Total sample High-density LLS Low density LLS
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Ability 2.35 0.50 2.39 0.48 2.20 0.56
I[Ability<25%] 0.25 0.43 0.22 0.41 0.36 0.48
I[Ability>75%] 0.25 0.43 0.26 0.44 0.20 0.40
No. firms in LLS 7.36 1.42 7.62 1.28 6.37 1.47
No. firms in LLS-ind. 5.49 1.82 5.81 1.72 4.28 1.67
No. workers in LLS 10.02 1.68 10.33 1.54 6.47 2.35
No. workers in LLS-ind. 8.07 2.27 8.49 2.05 6.47 2.35
Int. inputs/VA in LLS .88 .25 .87 .21 .89 .37
Int. inputs in LLS-ind. .83 .43 .83 .37 .83 .60
All non dichotomous variables in log. High-density LLS are defined as those with the total number
of firms over the population in the LLS above the median value by LLS. Ability is the estimate of
TFP. I[Ability<25%] is 1 if the ability is below the 25th percentile of the ability distribution and zero
otherwise. Ability and capital stock is from the CB sample; the number of firms and of workers are
computed from the INPS dataset (the population).
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Table 4: Firm efficiency and entrepreunerial share in the LLS
Panel A. Dependent variable: log TFP, OLS estimates
ESTOT 6.28∗
(3.43)
9.00∗∗∗
(3.83)
8.38∗∗∗
(1.34)
3.45
(2.33)
6.07∗∗
(2.46)
5.52∗∗∗
(0.93)
R2 .38 .38 .40 .40 .41 .42
No. obs. 15,837 27,173 137,907 15,837 27,173 137,907
Panel B. Dependent variable: I[Ability<25%], Probit estimates
ESTOT −7.39∗∗∗
(2.53)
−10.72∗∗∗
(2.70)
−8.72
(0.92)
∗∗∗ −3.32
(2.34)
−6.52∗∗∗
(2.14)
−4.44∗∗∗
(0.89)
Pseudo R2 .03 .04 .03 .04 .06 .05
No. obs. 15,837 27,173 137,907 15,832 27,173 137,907
Panel C. Dependent variable: I[Ability>75%], Probit estimates
ESTOT 2.46
(3.22)
3.65
(3.53)
3.90
(1.14)
∗∗∗ 1.51
(2.61)
3.15
(2.20)
3.52∗∗∗
(0.83)
Pseudo R2 .01 .01 .01 .03 .04 .03
No. obs. 15,837 27,173 137,907 15,810 27,173 137,907
Sample CS F. Avg Pool CS F. Avg Pool
Geo ctrl MA MA MA Prov Prov Prov
Dependent variable: ability in Panel A (OLS estimates); I[Ability<25%] in Panel B; I[Ability>75%] in
Panel C (Probit estimates). ESTOT is the total number of firms over the population in the LLS.
CS is the cross-section for 1991; Firm avg is the average over time at the firm level, after having
de-trended all variables with a full set of year dummies; Pool is the whole sample with all firm-year
observations. The geographical controls are Macro Area (MA, 4 dummies) and Provinces (Prov,
103 dummies). All regressions include industry and time dummies. Standard errors adjusted for
clustering al the LLS-year level. ∗∗∗indicates significance at 1%, ∗∗ at 5%, ∗ at 10%.
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Table 5: Firm efficiency and entrepreneurial share in the LLS-sector
Panel A. Dependent variable: log TFP, OLS estimates
ESTOT 0.67
(2.23)
1.72
(2.19)
1.42
(.79)
−1.41
(2.30)
−.93
(2.11)
−0.47
(0.83)
ESSECT 11.82∗
(6.58)
10.00∗∗
(5.93)
13.76∗∗∗
(2.32)
8.52∗∗∗
(3.13)
11.45∗∗∗
(2.69)
10.22∗∗∗
(1.33)
R2 .39 .38 .40 .40 .41 .42
No. obs. 15,837 27,173 137,907 15,837 27,173 137,907
Panel B. Dependent variable: I[Ability<25%], Probit estimates
ESTOT −4.22∗∗
(2.16)
−7.61∗∗∗
(1.88)
−6.13
(.75)
∗∗∗ 0.23
(2.53)
−2.25
(2.17)
−1.94∗∗
(0.98)
ESSECT −6.42
(4.64)
−6.13
(4.79)
−5.20∗∗∗
(1.68)
−6.34∗∗
(3.09)
−6.66∗∗
(2.74)
−4.31∗∗∗
(1.17)
Pseudo R2 .03 .04 .03 .04 .06 .05
No. obs. 15,837 27,173 137,907 15,832 27,173 137,907
Panel C. Dependent variable: I[Ability>75%], Probit estimates
ESTOT −4.10
(2.46)
−4.63∗∗
(2.25)
−3.77∗∗∗
(0.80)
−3.87
(3.28)
−4.18∗
(2.27)
−2.89∗∗∗
(1.00)
ESSECT 13.45∗∗∗
(5.30)
15.46
(5.03)
∗∗∗ 14.74∗∗∗
(1.69)
9.25∗∗
(3.76)
11.73∗∗∗
(2.58)
10.77∗∗∗
(1.17)
Pseudo R2 .01 .01 .01 .03 .04 .03
No. obs. 15,837 27,173 137,907 15,810 27,173 137,907
Sample CS Firm Avg Pool CS Firm Avg Pool
Geo controls MA MA MA Prov Prov Prov
Dependent variable: ability in Panel A (OLS estimates); I[Ability<25%] in Panel B; I[Ability>75%] in
Panel C (Probit estimates). ESTOT is the total number of firms over the population on the LLS,
ESSECT is the total number of firms in the LLS-sector over the population in the LLS. Standard
errors adjusted for clustering at the LLS-sector-year level. See Table 4 for the explanation of the
specifications.
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Table 6: Firm efficiency and externalities
Panel A. Dependent variable: log TFP, OLS estimates
No. firms .051∗∗∗
(.009)
.046∗∗∗
(.009)
.048∗∗∗
(.003)
.031∗∗∗
(.007)
.024∗∗∗
(.006)
.028∗∗∗
(.003)
Int.Inputs/VA .020
(.013)
.063∗∗∗
(.011)
.028∗∗∗
(.004)
.009
(.011)
.052∗∗∗
(.010)
.015∗∗∗
(.004)
Labor −.007
(.005)
−.001
(.005)
−.005∗∗
(.002)
−.001
(.004)
.004
(.004)
.001
(.002)
R2 0.39 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.42
No obs. 15,837 27,173 137,907 15,837 27,173 137,907
Panel B. Dependent variable: I[Ability<25%], Probit estimates
No. firms −.033∗∗∗
(.008)
−.036∗∗∗
(.007)
−.030∗∗∗
(.003)
−.018∗∗∗
(.008)
−.019∗∗∗
(.006)
−.015∗∗∗
(.002)
Int.Inputs/VA −.012
(.011)
−.048∗∗∗
(.010)
−.019∗∗∗
(.004)
−.002
(.011)
−.039∗∗∗
(.008)
−.008
(.004)
∗∗∗
Labor .002
(.005)
.003
(.004)
.001
(.002)
−.004
(.004)
−.001
(.004)
−.004∗∗∗
(.002)
Pseudo R2 0.032 0.052 0.038 .047 0.066 0.049
No. obs. 15,837 27,173 137,907 15,832 27,173 137,907
Panel C. Dependent variable: I[Ability>75%], Probit estimates
No. firms .052∗∗∗
(.008)
.052∗∗∗
(.007)
.050∗∗∗
(.003)
.036∗∗∗
(.007)
.035∗∗∗
(.006)
.033∗∗∗
(.003)
Int.Inputs/VA .038∗∗∗
(.012)
.073∗∗∗
(.010)
.048∗∗∗
(.004)
.030∗∗∗
(.012)
.066∗∗∗
(.010)
.039∗∗∗
(.004)
Labor −.007
(.005)
−.006
(.005)
−.007∗∗∗
(.002)
−.004
(.005)
−.004
(.004)
−.004∗∗∗
(.002)
Pseudo R2 0.027 0.031 0.026 0.038 0.042 0.037
No. obs. 15,837 27,173 137,907 15,810 27,173 137,907
Sample CS Firm Avg Pool CS Firm Avg Pool
Geo controls MA MA MA Prov Prov Prov
Dependent variable: ability in Panel A (OLS estimates); I[Ability<25%] in Panel B; I[Ability>75%] in
Panel C (Probit estimates). The number of firms, capital and labor are in logs and computed at the
LLS-industry level. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the LLS-sector-year level. See Table
4 for the explanation of the specifications.
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Table 7: Firm efficiency and externalities: controlling for LLS fixed effects
Panel A. Dependent variable: log TFP, OLS estimates
No. firms .0115
(.009)
.018∗∗∗
(.008)
.019∗∗∗
(.003)
Int.Inputs/VA .007
(.011)
.046∗∗∗
(.010)
.006
(.004)
Labor .005
(.005)
.004
(.004)
.002∗∗
(.002)
R2 0.43 0.43 0.45
N obs. 15,837 27,173 137,907
Panel B. Dependent variable: I[Ability<25%], Probit estimates
No. firms −.007
(.008)
−.016∗∗∗
(.007)
−.014∗∗∗
(.003)
Int.Inputs/VA −.000
(.011)
−.032∗∗∗
(.009)
.001
(.004)
Labor −.002
(.005)
−.001
(.004)
−.003∗
(.002)
Pseudo R2 0.063 0.076 0.060
No. obs. 15,525 26,876 137,529
Panel C. Dependent variable: I[Ability>75%], Probit estimates
N. firms .015
(.009)
.027∗∗∗
(.008)
.022∗∗∗
(.003)
Int.Inputs/VA .034∗∗∗
(.013)
.069∗∗∗
(.010)
.035∗∗∗
(.004)
Labor −.001
(.005)
−.004
(.005)
−.002∗∗∗
(.002)
Pseudo R2 0.044 0.049 0.044
N. obs. 15,837 26,476 136,694
Sample CS Firm Avg Pool
Geo controls LLS LLS LLS
Dependent variable: ability in Panel A (OLS estimates); I[Ability<25%] in Panel B; I[Ability>75%] in
Panel C (Probit estimates). The number of firms, capital and labor are in logs and computed at the
LLS-industry level. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the LLS-sector-year-year level. See
Table 4 for the explanation of the specifications.
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Table 8: Firm efficiency and firm number: OLS and IV regressions
Panel A. Dependent variable: log TFP
No. firms .030∗∗∗
(.004)
.030∗∗∗
(.003)
.029∗∗∗
(.001)
.035∗∗∗
(.007)
.019∗∗∗
(.006)
.025∗∗∗
(.002)
R2 .41 .40 .42 .40 .40 .42
No obs. 15,837 26,689 137,907 12,861 21,645 111,882
Panel B. Dependent variable: I[Ability<25%]
No.firms −.023∗∗∗
(.004)
−.021∗∗∗
(.003)
−021∗∗∗
(.001)
−.024∗∗∗
(.007)
−.010∗
(.006)
−.017∗∗∗
(.002)
R2 .058 .079 .060 .066 .091 .069
No. obs. 15,837 26,689 137,907 12,861 21,645 111,882
Panel C. Dependent variable: I[Ability>75%]
No. firms .030∗∗∗
(.004)
.031∗∗∗
(.003)
.029∗∗∗
(.001)
.034∗∗∗
(.006)
.028∗∗∗
(.004)
.027∗∗∗
(.002)
R2 .041 .043 .039 .046 .049 .044
No. obs. 15,837 26,689 137,907 12,861 21,645 111,882
Sample CS Firm Avg Pool CS Firm Avg Pool
Est. Meth. OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV
Dependent variable: ability in Panel A; I[Ability<25%] in Panel B; I[Ability>75%] in Panel C (linear
probability estimates). The first three columns report OLS estimates; the fourth to sixth columns
are IV estimates. The instrument is the population in the LLS in 1861. The Number of firms
is in log and computed at the LLS-industry level. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the
LLS-sector-year level. See Table 4 for the explanation of the specifications.
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Table 9: Knowledge spillovers and firm capital stock
Panel A. Dependent variable: log TFP, OLS estimates
No. firms .037∗∗∗
(.004)
.028∗∗∗
(.004)
.036∗∗∗
(.001)
.024∗∗∗
(.003)
.012∗∗
(.005)
.022
(.001)
No. firms*Small .014∗∗∗
(.002)
.029∗∗∗
(.008)
.016∗∗∗
(.001)
.014∗∗∗
(.002)
.030∗∗∗
(.008)
.016∗∗∗
(.001)
R2 .40 .40 .42 .41 .41 .43
No. obs. 15,837 27,173 137,907 15,837 27,173 137,907
Panel B. Dependent variable: I[Ability<25%], Probit estimates
No. firms −.028∗∗∗
(.003)
−.026∗∗∗
(.004)
−.027
(.001)
∗∗∗ −.012∗∗∗
(.004)
−.012∗∗∗
(.004)
−.018∗∗∗
(.001)
No. firms*Small −.006∗∗∗
(.001)
−.012∗∗∗
(.004)
−.007∗∗∗
(.001)
−.006∗∗∗
(.001)
−.006∗∗∗
(.001)
−.007∗∗∗
(.001)
Pseudo R2 .03 .05 .04 .05 .05 .05
No. obs. 15,837 27,173 137,907 15,832 27,173 137,907
Panel C. Dependent variable: I[Ability>75%], Probit estimates
No. firms .037∗∗∗
(.005)
.028∗∗∗
(.003)
−.035∗∗∗
(.002)
.024∗∗∗
(.004)
.012∗∗
(.005)
.022∗∗∗
(.001)
No. firms*Small .017∗∗∗
(.002)
.030
(.001)
∗∗∗ .018∗∗∗
(.001)
.017∗∗∗
(.002)
.030∗∗∗
(.008)
.018∗∗∗
(.001)
Pseudo R2 .04 .03 .04 .05 .04 .05
No. obs. 15,837 27,173 137,907 15,810 27,173 137,907
Sample CS Firm Avg Pool CS Firm Avg Pool
Geo controls MA MA MA Prov Prov Prov
Dependent variable: ability in Panel A (OLS estimates); I[Ability<25%] in Panel B; I[Ability>75%] in
Panel C (Probit estimates). The Number of firms is in log and computed at the LLS-industry
level. “Small” is a dummy =1 if the capital stock is below the median, calculated within each LLS-
industry-year cell. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the LLS-sector-year level. See Table 4
for the explanation of the specifications.
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Table 10: Knowledge dispersion and productivity
Panel A. Dependent variable: log TFP, OLS estimates
No. firms .039∗∗∗
(.005)
.038∗∗∗
(.005)
.040∗∗∗
(.002)
.026∗∗∗
(.004)
.024∗∗∗
(.004)
.026∗∗∗
(.001)
Dispersion .038∗∗∗
(.009)
.084∗∗∗
(.008)
.036∗∗∗
(.003)
.037∗∗∗
(.008)
.089∗∗∗
(.008)
.036∗∗∗
(.003)
R2 .38 .39 .40 .40 .41 .41
No. obs. 14,927 25,890 129,785 14,927 25,890 129,785
Panel B. Dependent variable: I[Ability<25%], Probit estimates
No. firms −.028∗∗∗
(.004)
−.029∗∗∗
(.004)
−.026
(.001)
∗∗∗ −.018∗∗∗
(.004)
−.020∗∗∗
(.003)
−.017∗∗∗
(.001)
Dispersion −.009
(.009)
−.030∗∗∗
(.007)
−.016∗∗∗
(.003)
−.011
(.008)
−.035∗∗∗
(.007)
−.018∗∗∗
(.001)
Pseudo R2 .03 .05 .03 .04 .06 .04
No. obs. 14,297 25,890 129,785 14,916 25,888 129,785
Panel C. Dependent variable: I[Ability>75%], Probit estimates
No. firms .041∗∗∗
(.006)
.039∗∗∗
(.004)
−.041∗∗∗
(.002)
.030∗∗∗
(.004)
.027∗∗∗
(.005)
.027∗∗∗
(.002)
Dispersion .055∗∗∗
(.012)
.100
(.012)
∗∗∗ .049∗∗∗
(.004)
.053∗∗∗
(.012)
.101∗∗∗
(.011)
.046∗∗∗
(.004)
Pseudo R2 .03 .03 .02 .04 .04 .04
No. obs. 14,927 25,890 129,785 14,884 25,869 129,773
Sample CS Firm Avg Pool CS Firm Avg Pool
Geo controls MA MA MA Prov Prov Prov
Dependent variable: ability in Panel A (OLS estimates); I[Ability<25%] in Panel B; I[Ability>75%] in
Panel C (Probit estimates). The number of firms is in log and computed at the LLS-industry level;
“Dispersion” is the log of the standard deviation of the capital stock within each LLS-industry-
year cell. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the LLS-sector-year level. See Table 4 for the
explanation of the specifications.
36
Figure 1: Number of firms in the Italian LLSs
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Figure 2: Distribution of log entrepreneurial ability for high (above the median) and low
density (n. of firms over population) LLS
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